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ABSTRACT: It has long been claimed that moral judgements are dominated by reason. In re-
cent years, however, the tide has turned. Many psychologists and philosophers now hold the 
view that there is a close empirical association between moral judgements and emotions. In 
particular, they claim that emotions (1) co-occur with moral judgements, (2) causally influ-
ence moral judgements, (3) are causally sufficient for moral judgements, and (4) are causally 
necessary for moral judgements. At first sight these hypotheses seem well-supported. In this 
paper I show, however, that appearances are deceiving. If one considers the relevant scientific 
studies in detail, one finds that in many interpretations the above hypotheses are either not 
supported or even contradicted by the available evidence. This conclusion is significant both 
for our understanding of moral judgements qua empirical phenomena and for normative eth-
ics and metaethics. 
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Despite some obvious exceptions (see, e.g., Hume, 1978, 1983), philosophers have typically 
considered moral judgements to be dominated by reason rather than emotion (see, e.g., Kant, 
1998; Seneca, 1978). When empirical moral psychology emancipated itself from philosophy, 
it first inherited philosophy’s emphasis on reason (see, e.g., Kohlberg, 1984; Piaget, 1965). In 
recent years, however, the tide has turned. More and more researchers engaged in empirical 
moral psychology are now sympathetic to the view that it is actually emotions which are in 
charge of moral judgements. Summing up the current state of research, Joshua Greene and 
Jonathan Haidt, two of the main proponents of this new “emotionist” paradigm (as I will call 
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it here)
1, write: “recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion 
and affective intuition than deliberative reasoning” (2002, p. 517; also quoted in Joyce, 2008, 
p. 375). 
The truth of emotionism would have significant implications for our understanding of 
moral judgements qua empirical phenomena. Moreover, there may also be repercussions for 
normative ethics and metaethics. Joshua Greene (2008), for example, has recently claimed 
that as deontological moral judgements are strongly influenced by emotions, and these emo-
tions would lead us to make these judgements independently of whether they are true, deon-
tological moral judgements are epistemically unjustified. We should adopt consequentialism. 
According to Jesse Prinz (2006, 2007, 2010), emotionism supports a certain view in philo-
sophical moral psychology, namely the view that moral judgements are essentially constitut-
ed by emotions.
2 Is emotionism plausible, then? Is the empirical association between moral 
judgements and emotions really as close as what many psychologists and philosophers have 
suggested? 
At first sight, scientific research really seems to support emotionism, and in a fasci-
nating and entertaining way. Relevant studies involve hypnosis and fart sprays, sex between 
siblings and the eating of dead pet dogs. This article shows, however, that appearances are 
deceiving. In section 1 I will clarify various key notions of the emotionist paradigm. Useful-
ly, this paradigm is divided into four sub-hypotheses: (1) the co-occurance hypothesis, (2) the 
causal influence hypothesis, (3) the causal sufficiency hypothesis and (4) the causal necessity 
hypothesis. In sections 2 to 5 I will exemplarily consider scientific studies that have been 
claimed to support these four hypotheses. It will turn out that on closer consideration, the 
results of most of these studies do not support emotionism in any significant way. Some of 
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1
 The hypothesis that moral judgements are closely associated with emotions in the sense at issue here has some-
times been referred to as “emotivism” (Clarke, 2008, p. 800; Haidt, 2001, p. 816) or “sentimentalism” (Prinz, 
2013, p. 302). I avoid these labels because “emotivism” is traditionally used to denote a certain metaethical 
position (the non-cognitivist position that moral judgements are constituted by, and moral sentences express 
emotions which do not purport to represent moral facts), and “sentimentalism” has been used to denote all kinds 
of metaethical and empirical claims about the relation between morality and the emotions. For two other philos-
ophers who use the term “emotionism,” though in somewhat different senses, see Jesse Prinz (2007, pp. 14, 16) 
and Hanno Sauer (2012, p. 105).   
2
 Here I do not want to take any stance on the soundness of emotionist arguments in favor of normative ethical 
or metaethical conclusions. At another occasion, however, I criticized several metaethical arguments of this 
kind, including the above one by Prinz, see Pölzler 2014, pp. 247-266). 
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these results even contradict (stronger versions of) the hypotheses of emotionism. Thus, while 
moral judgements are to some degree empirically associated with emotions, their relationship 
is not as intimate as what has recently been claimed.   
 
1. Clarifications 
According to the emotionist paradigm, moral judgements are closely empirically associated 
with emotions. Below we will see that one’s assessment of the empirical relation between 
moral judgements and emotions significantly depends on what one means by a moral judge-
ment. For now, however, let us focus on understanding the other two key notions of emotion-
ism, that is, what it is for a mental state to be an emotion and what emotionists mean when 
they claim that emotions are closely associated with moral judgements.  
Emotion theorists generally agree that emotions are responses to the perception of 
some stimulus, that they come along with physiological activation, and that they are therefore 
closely tied to action (see Johnson, 2009; but see, e.g., Nussbaum, 2004, p. 195). Consider, 
for example, the emergence and nature or implications of fear. First, I perceive some stimu-
lus: say, I observe or imagine a big dog barking at me (stimulus). I tremble, my heart rate 
increases, I start sweating (physiological activation), and this physiological activation leads 
me to run away from the dog, stand still, or shout for help (action).  
While there is agreement that emotions are responses to stimuli; that they involve 
physiological activation; and that they often lead to action, various other aspects of their na-
ture are highly contested. Most importantly, philosophers and psychologists hold fundamen-
tally different views about how the perception of the relevant stimulus is connected to our 
physiological activation and our subjective experience. William James (1884) and Carl Lange 
(1885), for example, famously claimed that fear is nothing but one’s awareness that one 
trembles, that one’s heart rate increases, that one starts sweating, and so on. Cognitivist theo-
ries of emotion, on the other hand, identify emotions with judgements about (e.g., Nussbaum, 
2004; Solomon, 1993), or appraisals of (e.g., Lazarus, 1991) the stimulus that persons re-
spond to when they have an emotion. To feel fear in the face of a barking dog, for example, 
on this view simply means to judge that the dog is dangerous. In other (Pölzler, 2014, p. 265) 
I suggested that which of these general theories of emotions one assumes significantly affects 
the plausibility of deriving certain normative ethical or metaethical conclusions from emo-
tionism. With one exception noted below, however, one’s general theory of emotions should 
not have much influence on the plausibility of emotionism itself.  
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Some proponents of emotionism have argued that moral judgements are closely associated 
with “full-fledged” emotions, such as anger, disgust, guilt, and shame. In recent years, how-
ever, much research has instead focused on what have been called “moral intuitions”: quick, 
automatic, and strongly motivating affective reactions (Haidt, 2001). Jonathan Haidt, the 
main proponent of the role of intuitions in moral judgement, explains:  
 
Moral intuition is defined as: the sudden appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of 
consciousness, of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about the character or ac-
tions of a person, without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search, 
weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion […]. (Haidt & Björklund 2008, p. 188) 
 
According to some theories of emotion, in particular more cognitivist ones, moral intuitions 
in this sense may not qualify as emotions: they may be too unconscious, too much beyond 
our control, or have too little cognitive content. And this is where I believe the general debate 
about the nature of emotions may have some influence on the degree of plausibility one is 
willing to ascribe to emotionism. In what follows, however, I will grant that moral intuitions 
— in the sense of unconscious, quick, automatic, and strongly motivating affective reactions 
— count as emotions as well.  
After having clarified the notion of emotions, let us ask what emotionists mean when 
they hold that moral judgements are “closely empirically associated” with emotions, or, as 
they have also put it, empirically “grounded” in emotions, “a matter of” emotions, or “based 
on” emotions (e.g., Prinz, 2006, 2007; Sauer, 2012). Empirical associations between moral 
judgements and emotions may take various forms. In this article I will focus on four particu-
larly prominent emotionist sub-hypotheses (as distinguished by Prinz, see 2006, pp. 30-33): 
 
1. The Co-Occurrence Hypothesis: Emotions co-occur with moral judgements 
2. The Causal Influence Hypothesis: Emotions causally influence moral judgements 
3. The Causal Sufficiency Hypothesis: Emotions are causally sufficient for moral 
judgements 
4. The Causal Necessity Hypothesis: Emotions are causally necessary for moral 
judgements 
 
All of these hypotheses can be true in weaker or stronger senses. For example, we may find 
that moral judgements sometimes correlate with emotions, or that they always do so; that they 
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correlate with weak or with strong emotions; that they are sometimes or often influenced by 
emotions; that this influence is weak or strong, and so on. Contemporary proponents of emo-
tionism typically hold several of the above hypotheses, and in rather strong forms (see, e.g., 
Prinz 2006, 2007). In the next sections I will examine the plausibility of this emotionist 
stance, discussing each of the above hypotheses in turn.  
 
2. The Co-Occurrence Hypothesis 
According to emotionism’s first sub-hypothesis, emotions co-occur with moral judgements, 
that is, they correlate with them or accompany them (for proponents see, e.g., Prinz 2006, p. 
30; Goodwin & Darley, 2010, p. 179; Sauer, 2012, p. 97). One might attempt to show this 
hypothesis true on purely conceptual grounds. In particular, it might be argued that to judge 
something morally right, wrong, good, bad, and so forth simply means having a certain emo-
tion towards it, and that a judgement that is unaccompanied by emotions therefore cannot 
possibly qualify as moral (for a classic non-cognitivist version of this view see Ayer 1952, p. 
108; for a prominent contemporary cognitivist version see Prinz, 2006, p. 34). As this 
metaethical claim is likely wrong (see, e.g., Egan, 2012: 566; Geach, 1965; Mackie 1980: 69; 
Miller, 2003, pp. 43–51), and at least very controversial, however, I will here exclusively 
focus on the available empirical evidence. Advocates of the co-occurrence hypothesis have 
cited various scientific studies in its favor. In what follows I will consider three of the most 
often-mentioned ones. 
 
2.1. Ultimatum Game 1  
The first study to be claimed to provide evidence for the co-occurrence hypothesis — con-
ducted by Alan Sanfey, James Ritling, Jessica Aronson, Leigh Nystrom, and Jonathan Cohen 
(2003) — focuses on so called “ultimatum games”. Ultimatum games are situations in which 
two players have to decide on how to divide a given sum of money. The first player makes a 
suggestion as to how to divide the sum. If the second player then accepts the first player’s 
offer, the money is divided accordingly. If the second player rejects the offer, none of the 
players get anything.  
In their study Sanfey et al. asked subjects to respond to various kinds of ultimatum 
game offers, some of them fair (the first player proposed an equal split), others to greater or 
lesser degrees unfair (unequal split to the proposer’s advantage). What is unique about the 
study and has been supposed to make it relevant for assessing emotionism is that, while sub-
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jects played the ultimatum game, they were in a functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) scanner which recorded their brain activity. It turned out that when subjects rejected 
unfair offers, there was increased activity in areas associated with emotions, in particular, 
with negative emotions (Sanfey et al., 2003, p. 1758). Likely, the rejection of unfair offers in 
ultimatum games is either motivated or at least accompanied by moral considerations. The 
second player may think, for example, that a certain split is so unfair that she or he would 
rather punish the proposer at her or his own expense rather than take the small sum the first 
player would grant. The result of the study has thus been claimed to suggest that moral 
judgements reliably come along with emotions.  
 
2.2. Ultimatum Game 2  
A second study often claimed to support the co-occurrence hypothesis — conducted by Mas-
cha van’t Wout, René Kahn, Alan Sanfey, André Aleman (2006) — also focuses on ultima-
tum games. Subjects were again asked to respond to various kinds of fair and unfair offers in 
such games. This time, however, experimenters did not attempt to measure their emotional 
engagement by neuroscientific methods, but by recording subjects’ skin conductance re-
sponses (which are indicative of the activity of sweat glands, and thus of emotions or stress). 
Van’t Wout et al. hypothesized that the rejection of unfair offers would be accompanied by 
significantly higher skin conductance levels than the acceptance of (unfair or fair) offers. And 
indeed, the prediction was found to hold. Subjects who rejected offers to the proposer’s ad-
vantage seem to have experienced significantly stronger emotions than subjects who accepted 
unfair or fair offers (2006, p. 566).  
 
2.3. Trolley Dilemma 
The study probably most often claimed to support the co-occurrence hypothesis is Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen’s famous Trolley dilemma study (2001). A moral 
dilemma is a situation in which one (seems to) have moral reasons to perform two or more 
different actions, but can actually only perform one of them. Greene et al. presented their 
subjects with various dilemmas that either involved inflicting harm in some personal or in a 
more impersonal way. Their most famous dilemmas are the so-called Trolley dilemmas, as 
they were originally introduced by Philippa Foot (1967), and later famously discussed by the 
Judith Jarvis Thomson (1985): 
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SWITCH 
A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present 
course. The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alter-
nate set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. Ought you to turn the trolley 
in order to save five people at the expense of one? (Greene et al., 2001, p. 2105) 
 
FOOTBRIDGE 
As before, a trolley threatens to kill five people. You are standing next to a large stranger 
on a footbridge that spans the tracks, in between the oncoming trolley and the five people. 
In this scenario, the only way to save the five people is to push this stranger off the bridge, 
onto the tracks below. He will die if you do this, but his body will stop the trolley from 
reaching the others. Ought you to save the five others by pushing this stranger to his death? 
(Greene et al., 2001, p. 2105) 
 
While subjects were thinking about these moral dilemmas, Greene et al. had their brain ac-
tivity recorded by a fMRI scanner. In line with their predictions it turned out that when sub-
jects thought about inflicting harm in an impersonal way, as in turning the trolley (which was 
typically judged permissible) there was significantly less activity in brain areas typically as-
sociated with emotions, and significantly more activity in brain areas typically associated 
with reasoning than when they considered personal violations such as pushing the stranger 
off the footbridge (which they typically judged impermissible) (Greene et al., 2001, p. 2107).  
Proponents of the co-occurrence hypothesis typically stress other aspects of the 
study’s results, though. First, they stress that in both impersonal and personal moral dilemmas 
subjects showed at least some activity in brain areas associated with emotions. And second, 
they stress that when Greene et al. presented their subjects non-moral dilemmas (e.g., situa-
tions in which one has both reason to travel by bus or by train, or to use one or another cou-
pon at a store) subjects showed less activity in brain areas typically associated with emotions 
than in both moral cases (see Prinz, 2007, pp. 24-25, 2010, p. 3, and in press, p. 9).  
 
2.4. Discussion 
Taken together, the three studies considered above provide some evidence in favor of the co-
occurrence hypothesis. Contrary to how they have sometimes been interpreted, however, they 
only support the hypothesis in the sense that moral judgements reliably correlate with weak 
emotions. One cannot infer from them that moral judgements correlate with strong emotions. 
In fact, the studies rather seem to undermine this stronger version of the co-occurrence hy-
pothesis. Consider, first, the ultimatum game studies. Subjects in these studies were found to 
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show strong emotions when they rejected unfair offers (i.e., offers according to which they 
would receive a significantly smaller amount of the sum to be divided than the proposer). 
When subjects accepted unfair offers or accepted fair offers they only showed weak emotion-
al activity. However, it is likely that many subjects made moral judgements when they ac-
cepted offers as well. For example, when they accepted an unfair offer they may have 
thought, “This guy is depraved, but I nevertheless will take the money!” When they accepted 
a fair offer, they may have thought, “Wow, that’s admirable!” So if moral judgements relia-
bly correlated with strong emotions, experimenters should have found strong emotions in 
these cases as well. 
Greene et al.’s study contradicts strong versions of the co-occurrence hypothesis even 
more clearly. As pointed out above, fMRI scans of subjects’ brains suggested significant var-
iation in the activation of areas typically associated with emotions. When subjects thought 
about the permissibility of causing harms in personal ways, such as pushing the stranger off 
the footbridge, they likely experienced strong emotions. In SWITCH and other impersonal 
dilemmas, in contrast, the emotional arousal was only weak. In fact, it was very weak, with 
the level hardly exceeding the base line and being almost as low as when subjects thought 
about non-moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001, p. 2106). 
 
 
Figure 1: Neural activity in subjects considering personal moral, impersonal moral, or non-moral 
dilemmas in Greene et al.’s 2001 study. Reprinted from “An fMRI investigation of emotional en-
gagement in moral judgment,” by J. D. Greene, B. R. Sommerville, L. E. Nystrom, J. M. Darley, and 
J. D. Cohen, 2001, Science, 293(5537), 2106. Copyright 2001 by The American Association for the 
Advancement of Science. Reprinted with permission. 
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In sum, then, while the studies considered in this section suggest that most moral judgements 
reliably correlate with (very) weak emotions, they do not support the view that all or most 
such judgements correlate with strong emotions. Judgements about hitting a switch in order 
to save five lives at the expense of one, say — or, as one might speculate, about issues such 
as climate change or copyright infringement — rather seem to be dominated by reasoned 
mental processes (see Greene et al., 2001; Paxton et al. 2012). 
 
3. The Causal Influence Hypothesis 
Proponents of the causal influence hypothesis claim that emotions do not only correlate with 
moral judgements, but also stand in a particular causal relation to them. A person’s anger, 
disgust, “moral intuitions” and so forth causally influence his/her moral judgements: they 
lead the person to judge things significantly more right, wrong, good, bad, and so forth than 
he/she would judge them if he/she did not have these emotions. In a weak sense this hypothe-
sis seems intuitively appealing. Most people would acknowledge that their emotions some-
times make them see things in a somewhat more negative or positive moral light. Many emo-
tionists believe, however, that the causal influence hypothesis is true in a much stronger 
sense: many or most of our moral judgements are influenced by our emotions, and they are 
influenced in very substantial ways. According to Jonathan Haidt’s famous social intuitionist 
model of moral judgement (2001), for example, we tend to judge things morally right, wrong, 
good, bad, and so forth because of moral intuitions that overcome us when we think about or 
observe these things. Reason, Haidt believes, typically only comes into play in the form of 
post-hoc rationalization (2001, pp. 814, 817). Such strong versions of the causal influence 
hypothesis have been thought to be supported by various psychological studies. In what fol-
lows I will again consider three of the most often cited studies.  
 
3.1. Disgust 1  
A first study often cited in favor of the causal influence hypothesis — conducted by Schnall, 
Haidt, Clore, and Jordan (2008a) — focuses on the influence of disgust on our moral judge-
ments. Subjects of the study were divided into two groups. The first group was confronted 
with stimuli likely to make them feel disgusted. In particular, they were seated in a room 
treated with “fart spray” (experiment 1), seated in a room that was dirty and untidy (experi-
ment 2), asked to recall a physically disgusting experience (experiment 3), or shown a video 
clip involving a dirty toilet (experiment 4). The second group was not confronted with these 
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stimuli. Subjects of both groups were then asked to rate the moral wrongness of a number of 
actions, for example sex between first cousins or driving instead of walking a short distance. 
The results of the study are commonly presented as showing that subjects in the disgust con-
ditions judged the actions significantly more wrong than those in the neutral conditions. 
Thus, disgust seemed to have a significant influence on subjects’ moral judgements. 
 
3.2. Disgust 2 
The second study — conducted by Schnall, Benton, and Harvey (2008b) — focused on the 
influence of disgust as well. All subjects of the study had to watch a film clip that involved a 
dirty toilet. After that they were divided into two groups. One group was asked to complete 
an otherwise unrelated task involving words associated with cleanliness, for example “pure”, 
“clean”, or “pristine” (experiment 1), or to wash their hands with soap and water (experiment 
2). The other group completed a task involving only neutral words (experiment 1), or were 
not given the opportunity to wash their hands (experiment 2). When subjects were then asked 
to evaluate actions such as turning the trolley in SWITCH, or eating one’s dead dog, those in 
the cleanliness conditions are often said to have judged these actions to be significantly less 
wrong than those in the neutral conditions. Thus, again, disgusting stimuli seem to have had a 
significant influence on subjects’ moral judgements. 
 
3.3. Positive Emotions  
Piercarlo Valdesolo and David DeSteno (2006), finally, conducted a study on the influence of 
positive emotions on moral judgements. Subjects were divided into two groups. One group 
was shown a comedy video (an episode of Saturday Night Live), the other had to watch an 
emotionally neutral documentary about a Spanish village. After they had watched the clips, 
both groups were confronted with the trolley dilemmas, as they were described above. That 
is, subjects were asked whether they thought it permissible to stop a runaway trolley heading 
towards five persons by turning it on an alternative set of tracks, where it would only kill one 
person (SWITCH); or by pushing a stranger off a bridge, where his dead body would block 
the trolley’s way (FOOTBRIDGE). Valdesolo and DeSteno found that those subjects who 
had watched the comedy video were significantly more likely to judge it permissible to push 
the stranger off the bridge in FOOTBRIDGE than those who had watched the neutral docu-
mentary. Thus, they suggested, positive emotions have a significant influence on our moral 
judgements (2006, p. 477).  
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3.4. Discussion 
Do the three studies considered above really support the view that emotions influence many 
of our moral judgements, and do so to a substantial degree? Contrary to common interpreta-
tions of the studies (see, e.g., Haidt, 2001; Joyce, 2007; Prinz, 2010), I will show that this 
conclusion is premature.  
The first problem with the common interpretation of the above studies suggests that 
studies employing their methodology may not have much relevance for assessing the causal 
influence hypothesis in general. In all three studies, let us grant for the moment, subjects who 
had a certain emotion reported significantly more or less severe judgements than subjects 
who did not have that emotion. These findings may of course be explained by the subjects’ 
emotions influencing their moral judgements. As has been pointed out by several critics of 
emotionism, however, the data are consistent with various alternative explanations as well. 
For example, it might be claimed that with regard to some or many of the actions subjects 
were presented with (say, incest), subjects’ emotions only influenced their perception of these 
actions rather than their moral judgements. They only made them more aware of these actions 
having certain morally relevant non-moral features (say, of the fact that children from inces-
tuous relationships may be disabled) (Huebner et al., 2009, pp. 1-3).
3
 According to another 
alternative explanation, subjects may have become aware of their having the emotion they 
were induced to have and incorporated this fact into their (unconscious) reasoning: “I feel 
disgust when I think of that action. So even though I can’t say what it is, there must be some-
thing wrong with that action” (see Jones, 2006, p. 50).4 Such alternative explanations of sub-
jects’ diverging responses may be deemed not particularly powerful. Yet in order for studies 
of the above kind to support (strong versions of) the causal influence hypothesis the studies 
would nevertheless have to give us reason to consider these explanations inferior to the ex-
planation that subjects’ emotions (strongly) influence their moral judgements. 
The second main problem with the above studies is that, as they are commonly pre-
sented, and as they have been presented here, their results are grossly exaggerated. Propo-
nents of the causal influence hypothesis have often suggested that in all of the above studies, 
emotions affected the severity of subjects’ moral judgements with regard to all or most of the 
                                                 
3
 This possibility is sometimes even conceded by emotionists themselves, for example by Prinz 2006, p. 31. 
4
 On both of the above mentioned explanations emotions influenced subjects’ moral judgements in some sense, 
namely indirectly, via influencing their awareness or reasoning. It might thus be objected that these explanations 
are consistent with the causal influence hypothesis. As the causal influence hypothesis is understood here, and 
as it is commonly understood, though, it claims that the effect of emotions is directly on people’s moral judge-
ments (see, e.g., Huebner et al., 2009, pp. 2-3). I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.  
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scenarios they were presented with, and to a rather strong degree. But this suggestion is clear-
ly wrong. Consider, first, Disgust 1. The first of the four experiments of this study showed a 
significant general effect of disgust on the severity of moral judgements of all subjects 
(Schnall et al., 2008a, p. 1099). In experiments two, three, and four, however, only disgusted 
subjects with a particular feature tended to judge the actions to be significantly more wrong 
than non-disgusted ones, namely those who were particularly aware of changes in their body 
(Schnall et al., 2008a, pp. 1100-1103). Moreover, even the results of experiment 1 do not 
support the causal influence hypothesis in any strong sense.  
Subjects in experiment 1 were asked to rate the wrongness of actions on a seven-
point-scale, with low scores indicating condemnation and high scores indicating permissibil-
ity. Those who conducted the survey in rooms that were mildly or significantly treated with 
fart spray on average judged the actions more wrong than those who conducted it in an olfac-
torily neutral environment. However, first, the effect was significant only with regard to two 
out of the four vignettes of the experiment (Marriage and Sex); and second, it was quite 
weak. In the neutral condition the wrongness of the actions was on average rated 3.75, in the 
mild stink condition 3.15, and in the strong stink condition 3.18 (2008a, p. 1099). That is, 
disgusted subjects judged the actions to be only slightly more wrong than non-disgusted ones 
(see May, 2014, pp. 131-133).  
 
 
Figure 2: Moral judgements in experiment 1 of Schnall et al.’s 2008 study on the causal influence of 
disgust on moral judgements. Low scores indicate moral condemnation; high scores indicate moral 
permissibility. Data from “Disgust as embodied moral judgment,” by S. Schnall, J. Haidt, G. L. Clore, 
and A. H. Jordan, 2008, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(8), 1099.  
 
The very same problems pertain to Disgust 2 as well. The results of this study are often 
claimed to suggest that the suppression of disgust makes our moral judgements milder to a 
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considerable degree. Actually, however, the effect of coming across cleanliness 
words/handwashing on subject’s wrongness ratings was found to be significant only with 
regard to 1 out of 6 of the scenarios presented in experiment 1 (“Kitten”) and 2 out of 6 in 
experiment 2 (“Trolley” and “Résumé”); and it was again quite small. On the nine-point 
wrongness scale of experiment 1 subjects in the non-disgust condition rated the actions at an 
average of 4.98 and subjects in the disgust condition at 5.81 (Schnall et al., 2008b, p. 1220). 
On the seven-point wrongness scale of experiment 2, subjects in the disgust condition rated 
the actions at an average of 4.73 and subjects in the non-disgust condition at 5.43 (Schnall et 
al., 2008b, p. 1221). 
 
 
Figure 3: Moral judgements in experiment 1 of Schnall et al.’s 2008 study on the causal influence of 
the suppression of disgust on moral judgements. Data from “With a clean conscience: Cleanliness 
reduces the severity of moral judgments,” by S. Schnall, J. Benton, and S. Harvey, 2008, Psychologi-
cal Science, 19(12), 1220. 
 
 
Figure 4: Moral judgements in experiment 2 of Schnall et al.’s 2008 study on the causal influence of 
the suppression of disgust on moral judgements. Scales ranged from “nothing wrong at all” (1) to 
 14 
“extremely wrong” (7). Data from “With a clean conscience: Cleanliness reduces the severity of mor-
al judgments,” by S. Schnall, J. Benton, and S. Harvey, 2008, Psychological Science, 19(12), 1221. 
 
Finally, the results of Positive Affect have often been exaggerated as well. Valdesolo and 
DeSteno’s study shows that positive affect condition subjects judged it more permissible than 
neutral condition subjects to save five lives at the cost of one in FOOTBRIDGE. Their per-
missibility ratings did not differ to any significant extent with regard to SWITCH, though 
(Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006, p. 477). 
 
 
Figure 5: Proportion of “appropriate” responses in Valdesolo and DeSteno’s 2006 study on the causal 
influence of positive effect on moral judgements. Data from “Manipulations of emotional context 
shape moral judgment,” by P. Valdesolo, and D. DeSteno, 2006, Psychological Science, 17(6), 477. 
 
In sum, our discussion of the above three studies suggests that the effects obtained in them 
are not sufficiently large and widespread to support the causal influence hypothesis in any 
strong sense. In fact, the available evidence even seems to contradict the claim that emotions 
frequently and strongly influence our moral judgements. Often, the emotions considered in 
the above studies did not exhibit any or only a limited effect.  
 
4. The Causal Sufficiency Hypothesis 
According to the causal influence hypothesis, emotions lead us to judge things significantly 
more or less right, wrong, good, bad, and so forth than we would have judged them without 
having these emotions. The next emotionist hypothesis discussed here, the causal sufficiency 
hypothesis, takes this claim one step further. Proponents of the hypothesis argue that the in-
fluence of emotions on our moral judgements is so strong that they sometimes or often even 
causally guarantee that we make such judgements. Emotions make us judge things in a posi-
tive moral light (right, good, etc.) that we would otherwise have judged negatively (wrong, 
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bad, etc.); and they make us judge things in a negative moral light (wrong, bad, etc.) that we 
would otherwise have judged positively (right, good, etc.). Supposedly, emotions can even 
make us judge things in moral terms that we otherwise would not have judged in these terms 
at all.  
Critics of emotionism have occasionally suggested that the causal sufficiency hypoth-
esis can be dismissed on conceptual grounds (e.g., Jones, 2006, pp. 48-50; Rachels, 1993, p. 
483; Sauer, 2012, p. 106). For example, it might be argued that in order for a person’s judge-
ment to qualify as moral (as opposed to, e.g., being merely about his/her preferences), it must 
be based on (relevant) reasons. The person must have come to hold the judgement by consid-
ering the interests of human beings, what is just, what is respectful, and so forth. As judge-
ments that are exclusively caused by disgust, happiness, or other emotions do not fulfil this 
condition, we can rule out a priori that any such judgement qualifies as moral, and therefore 
that there is any moral judgement exclusively caused by emotions. 
While there may indeed be some conceptual constraints on whether and to what ex-
tent a person’s moral judgements can be largely or completely caused by emotions, in this 
paper I start from the plausible assumption that any such constraints can be expected to be 
rather minor. The question of whether emotions are sufficient for moral judgements is thus 
primarily an empirical one. So does the available scientific evidence support the hypothesis 
that emotions are sometimes or often causally sufficient for making moral judgements? In 
what follows I will consider those two studies that emotionists have most often cited in sup-
port of this causal sufficiency hypothesis (see, e.g., Prinz, 2006, p. 31).  
 
4.1. Hypnosis 
The study that proponents of the causal sufficiency hypothesis most often appeal to in support 
of their view was conducted by Thalia Wheatley and Jonathan Haidt (2005).
5
 Similar to some 
of the research considered in the last section, Wheatley and Haidt’s study focuses on the ef-
fects of disgust. The main difference to other studies about the relation between moral 
judgements and emotions concerns the method that Wheatley and Haidt employ in inducing 
this emotion. Rather than, say, putting subjects in a dirty and untidy room or making them 
watch video clips, the study draws on the procedure of hypnotic induction. Subjects were 
hypnotized and implanted with the suggestion that as soon as they awake, they will feel dis-
                                                 
5
 Note that Wheatley and Haidt themselves do not suggest that their study supports the sufficiency hypothesis. 
They are also more cautious in the interpretation of their data than many of their emotionist commentators.  
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gust every time they come across a particular word (“often” or “take”). Wheatley and Haidt 
then presented subjects descriptions of a number of actions and asked them to rate their 
wrongness on a scale from 0 (“not at all morally wrong”) to 100 (“extremely morally 
wrong”). Some of the scenarios involved what could plausibly be qualified as a moral trans-
gression, such as second-cousins incest, bribery, or theft (2005, pp. 780-781). Other scenarios 
did not seem to contain any wrong-doing at all. For example, subjects were told about a stu-
dent council who picks topics for discussion that appeal to both professors and students alike 
(2005, p. 782).  
As they are most commonly described, the results of Wheatley and Haidt’s study are 
astonishing. When subjects received descriptions of the actions that contained their trigger 
word, and were thus likely to have felt disgust, they rated the actions as significantly more 
wrong than subjects who had not been confronted with their trigger word. The judgements of 
disgusted subjects are said to have become harsh even in cases in which we normally would 
not see any wrong-doing at all. In particular, subjects are often said to have even judged it 
wrong for the student council to pick discussion topics that appeal to professors and students 
alike. Asked why they had made these judgements, Wheatley and Haidt report subjects to 
have written comments such as “it just seems like he’s up to something,” that the student 
council is a “popularity-seeking snob,” or “I don’t know [why it’s wrong]; it just is” (2005, p. 
783).  
At first sight the results of Wheatley and Haidt’s hypnosis study seem to provide 
strong evidence for the causal sufficiency hypothesis. In particular, they seem to suggest that 
disgust can make us judge things wrong that we would otherwise judge right, or would not 
judge in moral terms at all. On closer consideration, however, it is doubtful whether such a 
conclusion can be drawn. Let us first look at subjects’ responses to those actions that can 
plausibly be said to involve moral transgressions. Here, we find both of the problems pointed 
out with regard to Disgust 1, Disgust 2 and Positive Emotions considered above: the method-
ological and the presentational one.  
First, all that can be understood from the results of Wheatley and Haidt’s study is that 
disgusted subjects were reported to have made more severe moral judgements. They rated 
first-cousin incest, bribery, theft, and so forth to be more wrong than those who did not re-
ceive their trigger-word and thus did not feel disgust. This finding, however, cannot only be 
explained by the hypothesis that disgust influenced subjects’ moral judgements, but also by 
the hypothesis that the disgust made subjects more aware of morally relevant non-moral fea-
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tures of the actions they were presented with, or by the hypothesis that subjects interpreted 
the presence of their disgust as a reason for judging these actions wrong.  
Second, Wheatley and Haidt’s results with regard to their transgression cases have al-
so often been presented in a notably exaggerated way (as also pointed out by May, 2014, p. 
128). Those subjects who had received descriptions that contained their disgust-inducing 
word on average made only somewhat harsher judgements than those who had not come 
across their trigger-word. In particular, while non-disgusted subjects rated the actions at 64.7 
(experiment 1) and 69.6 (experiment 2), those who were confronted with the disgust-inducing 
words rated them at 73.9 (experiment 1) and 73.4 (experiment 2) (see 2005, pp. 781-782). 
Moreover, the effect of the disgust did not occur consistently either. With regard to 4 out of 
the 6 scenarios of experiment 1 and 6 out of the 7 in experiment 2, the presence of the dis-
gust-triggering word did not have any significant effect on subjects’ wrongness-ratings (see 
2005, pp. 781-782).  
 
 
Figure 6: Combined mean wrongness ratings of transgression cases in experiment 1 and 2 of Wheat-
ley and Haidt’s 2005 study on the causal influence of hypnotically induced disgust on moral judge-
ments. Scales ranged from 0 (“not at all morally wrong”) to 100 (“extremely morally wrong”). Data 
from “Hypnotic disgust makes moral judgments more severe,” by T. Wheatley, and J. Haidt, 2005, 
Psychological Science, 16(10), 781-782. 
 
Given these problems, it is not surprising that many proponents of the causal sufficiency hy-
pothesis have in particular appealed to Wheatley and Haidt’s results of their non-
transgression part. Here the first of the above-mentioned problems — the methodological one 
— seems less virulent than in their transgression cases. We cannot rule out that subjects be-
came aware of their being disgusted and incorporated the presence of this emotion into their 
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reasoning when they thought about the wrongness of the actions they were presented with. 
However, as the student council’s action of picking discussion topics that appeal to both pro-
fessors and students alike does not seem to have any wrong-making features, subjects’ re-
sponses at least cannot be attributed to their disgust making them more aware of such fea-
tures. It is thus more likely than in the transgression cases that the disgust had a direct effect 
on subjects’ moral judgements (see Prinz, 2006, p. 31). That said, the problem of the distorted 
presentation of the study’s results even persists in the non-transgression case.  
Many emotionists have taken Wheatley and Haidt’s study to show that subjects’ dis-
gust affected their judgements about various different non-transgressions, and did so in a sub-
stantial way. Their disgust made them judge things wrong that they otherwise would have 
judged right, or that they would not have judged in moral terms at all (see, e.g., Joyce, 2007, 
p. 130; Prinz, 2006, p. 31; Sauer, 2012, p. 101). However, this common way of stating 
Wheatley and Haidt’s results is clearly misleading (see May, 2014, pp. 128-131). Across both 
of the study’s experiments, subjects were presented only one single case in which an action 
cannot plausibly be claimed to be wrong: the student council case mentioned above. And 
even in this single case disgust did not change the severity of subjects’ judgements to any 
large extent, let alone affected their polarity. Those subjects who had received a version of 
the story that did not contain their disgust-inducing word on average rated what the student 
council did at 2.7. For those for whom the word was present, the mean value was still only 14 
(2005, pp. 781-782).
6
 So on average, even disgusted subjects thought hardly anything was 
wrong with the student council trying to accommodate both the wishes of students and pro-
fessors.  
 
 
                                                 
6
 Of all of the 63 subjects of Wheatley and Haidt’s study, only two rated the wrongness of the student council’s 
action above the mid-point, and even here only mildly above the mid-point, meaning that they took the action to 
be somewhat wrong. Presumably, these were the subjects who expressed that the student council “seems like 
he’s up to something,” and that it is a “popularity-seeking snob” (see May, 2014, p. 130). 
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Figure 7: Mean wrongness ratings of the non-transgression case in experiment 2 of Wheatley and 
Haidt’s 2005 study on the causal influence of hypnotically induced disgust on moral judgements. 
Scales ranged from 0 (“not at all morally wrong”) to 100 (“extremely morally wrong”). Data from 
“Hypnotic disgust makes moral judgments more severe,” by T. Wheatley, and J. Haidt, 2005, Psycho-
logical Science, 16(10), 782-783. 
 
In sum, neither the transgression nor the non-transgression part of Wheatley and Haidt’s 
study provide any significant evidence for the claim that emotions are causally sufficient for 
moral judgements.  
 
4.2. Dumbfounding 
Two other studies that have been claimed to support the causal sufficiency hypothesis (con-
ducted by Haidt in collaboration with Koller and Dias in 1993, and in particular with Björ-
klund and Murphy in 2000) have become known under the heading of “moral dumbfound-
ing”. Subjects of both studies were presented descriptions of actions that are likely to evoke 
disgust, but were supposed not to involve any harmful consequences, neither for the person 
performing the actions nor for any other persons (see Haidt et al., 1993, p. 617; Haidt, 2001, 
p. 5). Here are three of the most well-known of these descriptions: 
 
INCEST 
Julie and Mark, who are brother and sister, are traveling together in France. They are both 
on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the 
beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At very 
least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already taking birth control 
pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy it, but they decide not to 
do it again. They keep that night as a special secret between them, which makes them feel 
even closer to each other. (Haidt et al., 2000, p. 16) 
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FLAG 
A woman is cleaning out her closet, and she finds her old [American or Brazilian] flag. She 
doesn't want the flag anymore, so she cuts it up into pieces and uses the rags to clean her 
bathroom. (Haidt et al., 1993, p. 617) 
 
DOG 
A family’s dog was killed by a car in front of their house. They had heard that dog meat 
was delicious, so they cut up the dog's body and cooked it and ate it for dinner. (Haidt et al., 
1993, p. 617) 
 
For each of the actions described in these vignettes, subjects of Haidt et al.’s studies were 
asked whether they thought it was wrong. With regard to most of the actions most of the sub-
jects within seconds declared that it was wrong. When they were then asked why they thought 
that the action was wrong, answers took a far less definitive form, though. Most subjects 
started out by suggesting that the action was wrong because it causes harm. With regard to 
INCEST, for example, it was pointed out that Julie might become pregnant and bear a disa-
bled child, or that the siblings sleeping with each other might harm their relationship. As the 
experimenter explained to the subjects, however, these justifications were bad. The actions 
did not involve any such harm (see Haidt et al., 2000, pp. 8-10). Haidt et al. assumed that if 
subjects had judged the actions wrong because of their supposed harmful consequences, the 
experimenter’s explanations should have led them to withdraw their judgements and to 
acknowledge that what Julie and Marc did, or what the persons in FLAG and DOG did, was 
not wrong after all. However, only a few subjects actually did withdraw their judgements 
(17% in Haidt et al.’s 2000 study, see 2000, p. 1). The broad majority was reported to have 
expressed surprise and confusion at it being unable to justify its judgement. They laughed, 
stuttered, and showed signs of uncertainty. In the end, however, they nevertheless held on to 
their views, insisting that they knew the actions were wrong (2000, p. 9). As Haidt et al. put 
it, these subjects were “dumbfounded.”7  
Many emotionists have taken Haidt et al.’s finding that subjects held on to their 
judgements without being able to cite reasons in their favor to suggest that these judgements 
were not based on reason, but exclusively on disgust. Subjects’ disgust was sufficient for 
causing their moral judgements (see, e.g., Haidt et al., 2000, p. 1; Prinz, 2006, p. 31). Howev-
er, there is reason to be sceptical about the dumbfounding studies’ supporting the causal suf-
                                                 
7
 More precisely, Haidt et al. define moral dumbfounding as “the stubborn and puzzled maintenance of a judg-
ment without supporting reasons” (2000, p. 1). 
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ficiency hypothesis. The fact that subjects held on to their judgements even though they could 
not cite reasons in their favor may be explained by the effect of disgust. There is at least one 
plausible non-emotionist explanation as well, though. Subjects may have had reasons for 
judging the actions described in INCEST, FLAT, DOG, and the other scenarios they were 
presented with to be wrong, but they may have simply been unable to articulate these reasons 
(say, because they did not have enough time to put their thoughts in order, or their judge-
ments were based on the automatic and non-conscious application of moral principles that 
they could not consciously access; see Jacobson, 2012; Jones, 2006, p. 50; Kauppinen, 2013, 
pp. 6-7; Wielenberg 2014, pp. 96-107).  
Initially, at least Haidt et al.’s main study (2000) seems to rule out this alternative ex-
planation. All of the study’s subjects were undergraduate students from a US university. This 
suggests that the subjects on average had a high socio-economic status, a high level of educa-
tion, and liberal political views. In other research, Haidt et al. had found that people who have 
a high socio-economic status, a high level of education, and liberal political views tend to 
justify their moral judgements predominantly by reference to harm (see in particular Haidt & 
Joseph, 2007). As the actions described in INCEST, FLAG, DOG, and the other scenarios 
that subjects were presented with (supposedly) did not involve any harm, this additional evi-
dence seems to imply that subjects probably did not have any reason to condemn these ac-
tions, not even inarticulate ones. Their judgements were exclusively due to disgust (see Haidt 
et al., 2000, p. 6). 
Following Jacobson (2012), however, I doubt that this appeal to moral foundations re-
search really shows the causal sufficiency explanation to be superior to the inarticulateness 
explanation. First, some subjects of Haidt et al.’s study could simply have had bad inarticu-
late harm-based reasons for condemning the actions. They could have thought that the actions 
involve harm in a way that they actually did not involve this harm (Jacobson, 2012, p. 292). 
Second and more importantly, indeed contrary to what Haidt et al. assume, there may even be 
good harm-based reasons for condemning Julie and Mark’s having sex, cleaning one’s toilet 
with the national flag, eating one’s dead pet dog, and so on. In INCEST, for example, Mark 
and Julie take a great risk of compromising their relationship. Although things turned out 
well, one can easily imagine that their having sex could have introduced an awkwardness that 
may have stayed between them for the rest of their lives. This recklessness of the siblings, 
which predicts their actually bringing about harm in other cases, may well justify condemn-
ing what they did (see Jacobson, 2012, p. 298-302). Cleaning one’s toilet with the national 
flag or eating one’s dead pet dog may also be said to cause harm, in particular, symbolic 
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harm. These actions may damage the meaning that people ascribe to the flag of a particular 
country or to the relation between a family and its pet dog (see Jacobson, 2012, p. 309-314; 
Kauppinen, 2008, p. 71, fn. 130). As Haidt et al.’s results are thus to some degree compatible 
with the hypothesis that subjects did have reasons for their moral judgements, reasons that 
they simply could not articulate, they do not lend any strong support to the causal sufficiency 
hypothesis either.  
In sum, Hypnosis and Dumbfounding provide some evidence for the hypothesis that 
emotions sometimes causally influence our moral judgements; but they do not by themselves 
show that emotions are causally sufficient for these judgements, let alone that they are often 
causally sufficient.  
 
5. The Causal Necessity Hypothesis 
The last emotionist hypothesis that will be discussed here is the causal necessity hypothesis. 
According to this hypothesis, emotions are causally necessary for moral judgements. A per-
son must have them (in a non-conceptual sense of “must”) in order to be able to judge any-
thing right, wrong, good, bad, and so forth. Following Prinz (2006, pp. 31-32), we can distin-
guish between two versions of the causal necessity hypothesis: (1) a synchronic and (2) a 
diachronic version.  
 
5.1. The Synchronic Causal Necessity Hypothesis 
On its synchronic reading the causal necessity hypothesis claims that we must have an emo-
tion any time we make a moral judgement: either at the particular time we make the judge-
ment, immediately before we will make it, or immediately after we made it. This entails, for 
example, that it is only possible to judge torturing puppies for fun wrong, if one feels (say) 
disapproval towards torturing puppies for fun around the time of that judgement; or that it is 
only possible to judge helping others good, if one feels (say) approval for helping others 
around the time of that judgement. Like with the co-occurance hypothesis, one might argue 
that the synchronic causal necessity hypothesis can be shown true on conceptual grounds. If it 
were conceptually impossible for a person to make a judgement in the absence of emotions at 
that time, then it would be impossible for there to be any causal way of making such judge-
ments in the absence of emotions either. Again, however, I will ignore this likely false, and at 
least very controversial metaethical claim and stick with the available empirical evidence.  
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So far no direct scientific research on the causal necessity of emotions for moral judgements 
has been conducted. Some of the studies we looked at in the previous sections, however, 
clearly do have implications for this issue. A strong version of the synchronic causal necessi-
ty hypothesis claims that any time we make a moral judgement we must have a strong emo-
tion. If this strong version of the synchronic causal necessity hypothesis was true, then for us 
to judge anything right, wrong, good, bad, and so forth would be causally impossible without 
having a strong emotion at that particularly moment, or slightly before or slightly after. This 
prediction, however, is contradicted by the studies on the co-occurrence of emotions and 
moral judgements considered above. People sometimes do make moral judgements in the 
absence of strong emotions. The Ultimatum Game studies, for example, suggest that we may 
only have weak emotions when we make moral judgements that are related to the acceptance 
of unfair or fair offers on how to split a certain good. Greene et al. found that when people 
consider impersonal moral dilemmas (such as whether it is permissible to save five lives at 
the cost of one by hitting a switch), there is only very weak activity in brain areas associated 
with emotions as well. At best, the synchronic causal necessity hypothesis could therefore 
turn out true in a weak sense. It could only be the case that we must have weak emotions in 
order to be able to make moral judgements.  
 
5.2. The Diachronic Causal Necessity Hypothesis 
Proponents of the diachronic version of the causal necessity hypothesis claim that for a per-
son to be able to make a moral judgement only requires that the person has had (certain) emo-
tions at any time of her/his cognitive development. These emotions are supposed to be caus-
ally necessary for acquiring a moral capacity, that is, for understanding what it means that 
something is right, wrong, good, bad, and so forth in the first place. The claim that emotions 
are causally necessary for moral judgements in this sense implies that it is causally impossi-
ble for a person to make moral judgements if she has never had the relevant emotions. An 
obvious test case for the diachronic causal necessity hypothesis is thus presented by persons 
who suffer from impairments of morally relevant emotions. If it could be shown that these 
persons lack our ordinary moral concepts, and that their lack of moral concepts is due to emo-
tional impairments, this result would provide some evidence in favor of the hypothesis.  
Proponents of the diachronic necessity hypothesis have argued that there are indeed 
persons that fit the above description. Their typical example is people suffering from psy-
chopathy: a personality disorder characterized by various anti-social affective and behaviour-
al patterns, such as exaggerated self-worth, manipulative charm, lack of guilt, remorse and 
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empathy, irresponsibility, impulsivity, and criminal tendencies. Jesse Prinz, for example, 
writes:  
 
Psychopaths are […] profoundly deficient in negative emotions, especially fear and sad-
ness. […] I think that psychopaths behave badly because they cannot make genuine moral 
judgments. They give lip-service to understanding morality, but there is good reason to 
think that they do not have moral concepts—or at least they do not have moral concepts that 
are like the ones that normal people possess. […] Research on psychopathy suggests that 
emotions are developmentally necessary for acquiring the capacity to make moral judg-
ments. (Prinz, 2006, p. 32; see also, e.g., Gill & Nichols 2008, p. 144; Greene, 2002, pp. 
157-161; Haidt, 2001, p. 15; Nichols, 2002; Sauer, 2012, pp. 98-99) 
 
Proponents of the diachronic causal necessity hypothesis are right that psychopaths show 
impairments of morally relevant emotions. This claim is supported by various psychological 
studies. For example, compared to non-psychopaths, psychopaths have been found to show 
reduced activity in brain areas commonly associated with emotions (e.g., Blair, 2007), to be 
less aroused by certain kinds of distress cues (e.g., images of screaming children; e.g., Blair, 
1997; Blair et al., 1999), and to be worse at recognizing fear in the faces of strangers (e.g., 
Marsh and Blair, 2008). Psychopaths’ inability to feel emotions such as guilt, remorse and 
empathy is even part of the very criteria that are used to diagnose the condition (see Robert 
Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist – Revised; Cooke & Michie, 2001, p. 172).  
If psychopaths lacked our ordinary moral concepts, this fact could also plausibly be 
explained by their emotional deficits (see Nichols, 2002, pp. 295-299). Some researchers 
have suggested that psychopaths lack ordinary moral concepts because they are unable to 
take the perspective of others (see, e.g., Nagel, 1986, p. 140). Two of the main characteristics 
of psychopaths’ condition, however, are that they frequently try to manipulate others and are 
extremely skilled in doing so (see again Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist – Revised; Cooke & 
Michie, 2001, p. 172). Behavior of this kind clearly requires considering issues from the an-
gle of third persons.  
According to another popular alternative explanation, the reason for psychopaths’ 
lack of moral concepts is that they are irrational (e.g., Maibom, 2005). This explanation is 
worse than ones that appeal to emotional deficits as well. First, the kind of practical irration-
ality that at least some psychopaths have been found to show is likely a product of their emo-
tional impairment itself (Damásio, 1994, p. 144). And second, a significant proportion of 
psychopaths do not appear to be irrational at all. This is suggested, among others, by their 
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success in business and other realms of society (see Babiak & Hare, 2006, p. 193; Board & 
Fritzon, 2005).  
As psychopaths do seem to suffer from impairments of morally relevant emotions and 
their having these impairments would provide the best explanation of their lacking moral 
concepts, the crucial question in determining their status as evidence for the diachronic ne-
cessity hypothesis is whether they indeed lack ordinary moral concepts. Are psychopaths 
truly unable to understand what it means for a thing to be right, wrong, good, bad, and so 
forth? Proponents of the diachronic causal necessity hypothesis have sometimes assumed that 
this question can be settled by considering scientific evidence as well. For example, it has 
been argued that psychopaths likely lack ordinary moral concepts because psychological 
studies have shown them to apply moral concepts in the following unusual ways: (1) psycho-
paths are more likely than non-psychopaths to advocate pushing a stranger off a bridge in 
order to save five others in the FOOTBRIDGE version of the trolley dilemma (Koenigs et al., 
2011); (2) psychopaths are less likely than non-psychopaths to universalize their moral 
judgements to social groups or humanity as a whole (see Maibom, 2005); and (3) psycho-
paths ascribe significantly higher or lower degrees of seriousness, universality, authority-
independence, and harm-relatedness to moral norms than non-psychopaths, that is, on one 
conception of these norms, they are worse at distinguishing between moral and conventional 
norms (e.g., Blair, 1995; Blair et al., 1997).  
Contrary to proponents of such arguments, however, it is doubtful that scientific in-
quiry of the above kind by itself can determine whether psychopaths have ordinary moral 
concepts. All that the above studies show (if their results can be trusted) is that psychopaths 
apply moral concepts differently from non-psychopaths. Whether these differences also count 
as evidence for their lacking ordinary moral concepts depends on what we think those con-
cepts mean. In order for the particular findings mentioned above to support the conclusion 
that psychopaths lack moral concepts, for example, it would have to be the case that judging 
it impermissible to cause certain kinds of personal harm, being willing to universalize one’s 
judgements, and ascribing to these judgements particular degrees of seriousness, universality, 
authority-dependence, and harm-relatedness are essentially related to having moral concepts. 
Whether these claims hold is metaethically controversial. This means that although the avail-
able scientific evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that emotions are necessary to de-
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velop moral concepts, this hypothesis must not be accepted without additional philosophical 
arguments.
8  
 
Conclusion 
Many psychologists and philosophers nowadays hold that moral judgements are closely em-
pirically associated with emotions. In particular, they claim that emotions (1) co-occur with 
moral judgements, (2) causally influence moral judgements, (3) are causally sufficient for 
moral judgements, and (4) are causally necessary for moral judgements. In this article I ex-
amined various scientific studies that have been claimed to support the above hypotheses. 
Even after inadequate methodological assumptions, interpretations and presentations have 
been corrected, the results of these studies must not be overestimated. Most of them are based 
on rather unrepresentative samples and involve unrepresentative (sensational and unrealistic) 
moral issues (e.g., Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 808; Joyce, 2009; Kauppinen, 2008, pp. 92-93). 
The interpretation of their data often significantly depends on controversial philosophical 
questions about the meaning of moral judgements (see, e.g., The Diachronic Causal Necessi-
ty Hypothesis). And the neuroscientific studies that were considered have recently been criti-
cized on specific methodological grounds as well (Klein, 2011).  
That said, the above studies provide at least some evidence about the plausibility of 
emotionism. Although moral judgements are associated with emotions to some degree, this 
association is less close than has recently been suggested. Moral judgements reliably co-
occur with weak emotions, but only sometimes with strong emotions. Moral judgements are 
sometimes and to some weak degree causally influenced by emotions, but currently no con-
vincing evidence proves that this happens often and that we are led to judge things consider-
ably more right, wrong, good, bad, and so forth than we would have done in the absence of 
emotions. None of the above studies suggests that emotions are causally sufficient for moral 
judgements, let alone that they are often sufficient. Finally, while it is not clear yet whether 
emotions are necessary for developing a capacity to make moral judgements, or whether 
weak emotions are necessary to exercise this capacity in particular cases, we can confidently 
rule out that we need to have strong emotions in order to be able to make particular moral 
judgements.  
                                                 
8
 As argued by proponents of experimental philosophy, certain kinds of scientific evidence (in particular, evi-
dence about the conceptual intuitions of ordinary people) may be relevant to determining the meaning of our 
concepts. Conceptual analysis must always include some extent of a priori philosophical reflection as well, 
though (see, e.g., Kauppinen, 2007). 
 27 
These findings do not only enrich our understanding of moral judgments qua psychological 
phenomena, they also suggest that most attempts to derive normative ethical or metaethical 
conclusions from strong versions of emotionism are doomed. Such attempts can typically be 
rejected on purely empirical grounds. At best, philosophical claims may be supported by 
weak versions of emotionism, but then these philosophical claims are likely to be weak — in 
the sense of less significant and interesting — themselves.  
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